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During the last decades, genetic information has become increasingly available and 
accessible. Because of this increase in availability, it is important to understand the 
psychological impact genetic testing has on consumers and its potential social and ethical 
implications. The purpose of this study was to examine how genetic beliefs might interact 
with behavior to influence the broader belief in free-will. Three hundred sixty-nine 
undergraduate participants were asked to provide a saliva sample, which was used as a 
deceptive mechanism, and were subsequently randomly assigned to learn that they 
possessed a gene variant that was associated with either risk-taking or risk-avoidance. 
Afterward, they completed a behavioral measure of risk-taking and a measure of free-will 
beliefs. Our results indicated that participants in the positive risk genetic feedback condition 
scored significantly higher on the risk-taking behavior measure compared to the participants 
assigned to the negative risk genetic feedback condition. However, the congruence between 
behavior and genetic feedback was not associated with a diminished perception of overall 
free-will amongst participants. We conclude that, even though the connection between 
genetic attributions and personal agency needs further investigation, our study provides 
additional evidence for the importance of genetic information by replicating the effect of 
genetic beliefs on behavior and contributes to the literature by showing that those effects are 
not limited to concrete, health-related, or stigmatized outcomes, or to variables with a strong 
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1.1.Psychology of Free Will Beliefs  
Free will in psychology is no longer a metaphysical concept. With the advent of 
modern neuroscience and the increasing understanding of cognition, the concept of free 
will has become outdated and any metaphysical account of free will is generally rejected 
in psychological science (Brembs, 2011). Today, when discussing free will, we are no 
longer talking about a metaphysical, abstract idea “according to which human souls float 
free above the mechanistic constraints of the physical world”, but, rather, “an embodied 
free will, tethered to biology, that encompasses our ability to respond to complex 
circumstances in complex and unpredictable ways and in the process to build a self” 
(Turkheimer, 2011, p. 826). This way of looking at free has offered an empirical start 
point from which psychologists could start making claims about whether people “have a 
choice” or are “determined” in their behavior.  
Initially, free will was addressed in psychology by invoking different notions, such 
as self-regulation, controlled processes, behavioral plasticity, and conscious decision-
making (Baumeister, 2008). More recently, psychologists have also investigated how 
people define or understand free will (e.g., Monroe & Malle, 2010; Stillman, 
Baumeister, & Mele, 2011), as well as individual differences in free will beliefs (e.g., 
Paulhus & Carey, 2011). 
It is important to note that a multitude of psychological research casts doubt on the 
very existence of free will by looking at the direct causes of action for behavior. Many 
have shown that factors outside of conscious awareness, functioning mostly as 






free conscious choosing, even when those actions might be perceived as “free” (e.g., 
Bargh, 1994; Libet, 1999; Wegner, 2002; Wilson, 2002, as cited in Baumeister, 2008). 
In fact, according to Baumeister (2008), “the fact that automatic, nonconscious processes 
are the direct causes of action seems now well established and has dealt a severe blow to 
some theories of conscious free will” (p. 15).  
Bargh (2008) offers a review of scientific evidence for the fact that the causes of 
action and experience are mainly unconscious, instead of conscious. Examples of such 
phenomena are the fact that evaluation of novel objects happens automatically and is 
immediately connected to automatic behavioral (motoric) tendencies, as well as the fact 
that brain-wave impulses to act precede conscious awareness of the intention to act. 
Moreover, Bargh (2008) describes how people’s unconscious goal pursuit over time can 
happen in the absence of ability to accurately self-report on one’s intentions, how people 
unconsciously mimic others’ behavior, and, overall, how people’s conscious self-
regulatory capacity is surprisingly scarce (p. 148) to support the overarching argument 
that while the phenomenological feeling of free-will seems very real, free-will itself as a 
determinant of behavior is illusory (p. 149).  
The question, of course, remains whether conscious control or awareness are to 
be equated with free will. Most likely, the answer must be no, since “even behavior that 
subjects believe to be completely under conscious control is influenced by external 
factors” (Baer, Kaufman, & Baumeister, 2008, p. 221). Nonetheless, one has to keep in 
mind that those studies do not provide conclusive evidence against free-will. After all, 
the fact that behavior is not under utter conscious control, but influenced by external 






(2008), “the deterministic hypothesis—that every event is fully and inevitably caused by 
prior events and nothing else than what happened was ever possible—is itself unproven 
and even unprovable, so it requires a big leap of faith” (p. 15). Even though every action 
might not be under conscious control, that is not to say that free will is never exercised.  
Psychological inquiry into the existence of free-will has thus hit a perhaps 
predictable roadblock. Yet, regardless of whether free will exists or not, people’s beliefs 
about free will, as well as the ways that those beliefs might impact their cognition and 
behavior, in spite of whether they are correct, plausible, or justifiable by facts, are real 
and very much within the expertise of psychologists (Baumeister, 2008).  In fact, an 
important contribution to the evolution of the concept of free will within psychology was 
made by Vohs and Schooler (2008), who brought back the concept of free will and 
initiated an innovative direction by addressing it directly and experimentally. They 
avoided contributing to the debate about the existence of free will, and instead focused 
on the belief in free will by manipulating people’s beliefs in it. As they had foreseen, 
they found that people’s behaviors changed as a result of being induced to believe or not 
believe in free will (Baumeister, 2012).  
Later on, Feldman (2016), defined the belief in free will as a core belief that 
views humans as free from both external constraints (e.g., luck, fate, God, the 
environment, society, other agents) as well as internal deterministic factors (e.g., urges, 
needs, genes, personality, affect). According to Feldman (2016), “people differ in their 
beliefs regarding the human capacity for choice; some people view their behaviors and 
lives as a consequence of their own agentic free choice, whereas others believe that they 






their upbringing, personality, or genetics, or by externals factors such as God, nature, 
science, or fate” (p. 2). Importantly, different free will beliefs predict widely different 
variables, and have been found to have numerous consequences for behavior and well-
being. As a consequence, the “debate over free will has societal, as well as scientific and 
theoretical implications” (Vohs & Schooler, 2008, p. 49). 
The belief in free will is widespread and intuitive. Often, people feel that they are 
“making a choice in which more than one outcome is possible” (Dewall, Baumeister, & 
Masicampo, 2008). This widely spread belief in free will has essential implications for 
the way society functions. For example, religious beliefs, particularly but not only in the 
Western culture, emphasize the existence of free will as a central element of human life. 
Thus, punishment and salvation are granted on the basis of the freely chosen acts of 
virtue or sin. 
Notably, the importance of free will belief for retributive purposes does not end 
with religious beliefs or practices but has tangible consequences in the real world. The 
legal system also allocates guilt and punishment differentially based on perceptions of 
the rule breaker’s capacity for free choice (Baumeister, et. al., 2009), with perceived 
reductions in the capacity for free choice functioning as valid reasons for reduced 
punishment or even acquittal (Baumeister, et. al., 2006, p. 260,). In fact, a series of 
studies done by Shariff (2014) demonstrated that “people with weaker free-will beliefs 
endorsed less retributive attitudes regarding punishment of criminals, and that mere 
exposure to modern neuroscience can be sufficient to reduce retributivist motivations 






While the focus on free will might be especially evident in the Western culture, 
where people share a belief in human freedom of action (Baumeister, 2009), the 
implications of free will beliefs seem to surpass cultural barriers and depict a feature of 
the human condition. For example, Brembs (2011) studied invertebrate models in order 
to draw conclusions about the neurobiological basis of decision-making and concluded 
that the belief in free will has an important, positive, and functional role for the self in 
adaptation and survival (cited in Feldman, et al., 2016). Dennett (2003) and Hume 
(1748) also argued that free will beliefs play a role in the pursuit of what a person wants 
or needs.  
Furthermore, belief in free will also plays an important role in the coordination 
with others in society and general involvement in prosocial behavior. Specifically, 
Baumeister, Masicampo and DeWall (2006) found that belief in free will requires, to a 
certain extent, thoughtful reflection, as well as a willingness to exert energy, which 
promote helpfulness and reduce aggression among lay people. Similarly, free will beliefs 
seem to lead to more honest behavior (Vohs & Schooler, 2008). On the other hand, 
disbelief in free will seems to rely on more selfish, automatic impulses that lead to less 
socially desirable behaviors, such as reduction in the willingness to help and increased 
aggression. Strikingly, Vohs and Schooler (2008) found that even a brief exposure to a 
message asserting that there is no such thing as free will can increase both passive and 
active cheating, which raises the concern that “advocating a deterministic worldview 
could undermine moral behavior” (p. 53).  
Free-will belief has also been found to have numerous important implications for 






subjective well-being, whereas belief in determinism or fate lowers subjective well-
being (Carey & Paulhus, 2013; Kondratowicz-Nowak & Zawadzka, 2018). Additionally, 
free will believers were found to be more satisfied with life, have more positive 
emotions, and feel healthier than those who held more deterministic views (Crescioni, 
Baumeister, Ainsworth, & Lambert, 2016; Kondratowicz-Nowak & Zawadzka, 2018; Li, 
Wang, Zhao, Kong, & Li, 2017). Belief in free will is also associated with a sense of 
belongingness, which facilitates greater meaningfulness (Moynihan, Igou & Tilburg, 
2017), and gratitude (MacKenzie, Vohs & Baumeister, 2014). Following such findings, 
some researchers argued that there is a need to develop and promote belief in free will in 
societies and social policies as a means to increase general well-being (Kondratowicz-
Nowak & Zawadzka, 2018, p. 109). 
The link between belief in free will and self-regulatory success would certainly 
support such arguments. That is, belief in free will contributes to autonomous action, 
resisting temptations and pressures to conform. In a study done by Alquist, Ainsworth & 
Baumeister (2013), people who habitually had higher levels of belief in free will 
reported lower conformity across a broad variety of everyday situations. Additionally, 
experimentally reduced free will beliefs caused increases in conformity. Similarly, free 
will beliefs predicted higher perceived ability and positive attitudes toward decision 
making (Feldman, Baumeister, & Wong, 2014). Moreover, belief in free will seems to 
also predict perseverance for long-term goals (Li, Zhao, Lin, Chen, Wang, 2018), self-
efficacy and less suffering from helplessness (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012), as well as 
lead to better academic and job performance (Feldman, Chandrashekar and Wong, 






the endorsement of the belief in free will are a significant and unique predictor of 
academic achievement. In a similar fashion, Stillman, Baumeister, Vohs, Lambert, 
Fincham and Brewer (2010) reported that the effect of free will beliefs on job 
performance indicators was significant and independent of other well-established 
predictors (e.g., conscientiousness, locus of control, work ethic), with stronger belief in 
free will corresponding to more positive attitudes about expected career success, and 
employees who believed in free will receiving better performance evaluations from 
supervisors than those who disbelieve in free will.   
In conclusion, extant research indicates that, regardless of the reality of free will, 
beliefs in free will are malleable, and have observable psychological, moral and societal 
implications. Free-will beliefs underlie perceptions of moral responsibility (e.g.; 
Eshleman, 2004 and Nahmias et al., 2005, as cited in Shariff, 2014), and play an 
important role in well-being (Carey & Paulhus, 2013; Kondratowicz-Nowak & 
Zawadzka, 2018; Paulhus & Carey, 1994), social coordination and prosocial behavior 
(Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2006), adaptation and survival (Brembs, 2011), 
autonomous action (Alquist, Ainsworth & Baumeister, 2013), decision making 
(Feldman, Baumeister, & Wong, 2014), goal pursuit (Li, Zhao, Lin, Chen, Wang, 2018), 
etc., which suggests that it might be an important, fundamental aspect of the human 
condition.  
1.2.Genetic Attributions and Personal Agency  
Since the first genome was sequenced in 2013, genetic information has become 
increasingly available and accessible. People can now peer into their genetic makeup and 






(Heine, 2018). Their genomes can tell them incredible things, including insight into who 
their ancestors were (Akpan, 2017), what kind of psychological and physical attributes 
they are predisposed to have (Heine, 2018), and even their political attitudes, religiosity, 
vocational interests and phobias (see Bouchard, 2004, for a review). While there are 
certainly advantages to having access to this information, there may also be downsides 
in the sense that evidence for genetic contributions to personal characteristics might 
undermine a person’s sense that those characteristics are determined.  Free-will and 
determinism, or the philosophical belief that all events are determined completely by 
previously existing causes (in this case, genes), have often been viewed as opposites. 
One of the most popular measures of free will belief in psychology, the Free Will and 
Determinism Scale (FWDS; Rakos, Laurene, Skala, & Slane, 2008), treats determinism 
as the polar opposite of free will, such that increases in one belief correspond to 
decreases in the other (Baumeister, 2012). This antagonistic relationship between free-
will and determinism may be especially strong in lay people’s reasoning about genes.  
There is a multitude of research showing that when people are exposed to 
information that a characteristic has a genetic component, they tend to adopt a biased 
mindset characterized by greater beliefs that the characteristic is uncontrollable, 
immutable, discrete, and determined entirely by genes (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 
2011). They come to see the gene as the “essential” cause of the characteristic. As 
described by Vess, Brooker, Stichter and Neiderhiser (2018) in a sister project, “this 
orientation, referred to as genetic essentialism, is characterized by four defining 
qualities. First, people view the heritable characteristics with a sense of fatalism, 






and determined. Second, people tend to see the heritable characteristic as fundamentally 
caused by genes. This means that people view characteristics that are described in terms 
of their genetic origins as relatively less influenced by social or environmental forces. 
Third, people see those who possess the gene as members of a distinct group and those 
who do not possess gene as unlikely to possess the characteristic linked to the 
gene.  Fourth, and finally, characteristics described in terms of genetics are viewed as 
natural, implying in many cases that they are “good” because they follow a natural 
tendency.” (p. 170). Fundamentally, when people are exposed to an argument that has a 
genetic basis, they tend to experience an essentialist bias that “leads people to adopt 
stronger views that the phenomena are natural, immutable, discrete, and solely caused by 
genetic influence” (Vess, et al., 2018, p. 170). 
Critically, the adopted “genetic essentialist” orientation produces a cascade of 
downstream consequences, many of which are suggestive of a diminished sense of 
personal agency.  Research indicates that people implicitly associate genes with fate 
more than they do with choice, and according to Gould and Heine (2012), these implicit 
associations can help explain the essentialist reactions that people show when 
encountering genetic concepts (p. 3). Not surprisingly, genetic attributions are also 
associated with conscious feelings of personal control. For instance, genetic attributions 
for the etiology of illness were found to be associated with decreased personal control 
over that illness (Sheldon, 2017). Similarly, an increased perception of genetic etiology 
leads to a reduction in the sense of personal agency and ultimately the sense that one can 
choose freely in an unconstrained manner (Dar-Nimrod & Lisandrelli, 2012). More 






attributions and various negative health-related characteristics, including individual’s 
inactivity (Beauchamp, Rhodes, Kreutzer, & Rupert, 2011), weight (Dar-Nimrod, 
Cheung, Ruby, & Heine, 2014; McVay, Steinberg, Askew, Kaphingst, & Bennett, 2016; 
Wang & Coups, 2010), nicotine dependence (Wright, Weinman, & Marteau, 2003), and 
susceptibility to alcoholism (Dar-Nimrod, Zuckerman, & Duberstein, 2013), finding a 
negative relationship between genetic attributions and perceived personal control. 
The effects of genetic etiology beliefs on feelings of personal control may also 
extend to actual behavior by instilling a set of expectations that guide people towards 
responses in line with those expectations (Turnwald, Goyer, Boles, Silder, Delp, & 
Crum, 2018). For example, Bloss, Schork, and Topol (2011) found that receiving a 
higher genetic risk result for obesity leads to unhealthier dietary intake and decreased 
exercise three months later. Similarly, Lineweaver, Bondi, Galasko, and Salmon (2014) 
found that informing older adults that they have an APOE genotype associated with an 
increased risk of Alzheimer's disease can have adverse consequences on their 
performance on objective memory tests. A recent study by Turnwald et. al (2018) tested 
whether merely learning one’s genetic risk for disease alters one’s actual risk for that 
disease. To answer this question, they genotyped individuals for actual genetic risk and 
then randomly assigned them to receive either a “high-risk” or “protected” genetic test 
result for obesity. The results were astonishing: “merely receiving genetic risk 
information changed individuals’ cardiorespiratory physiology, perceived exertion, and 
running endurance during exercise, and changed satiety physiology and perceived 
fullness after food consumption in a self-fulfilling manner” (Turnwald et. al, 2019, p. 1). 






genetic risk as indexed by the genotyping. In sum, there is evidence to indicate that 
genetic beliefs can be impactful enough to causally impact actual behavior. 
1.3.Purpose of the Study  
Although the extant research indicates that genetic beliefs can diminish perceived 
control and produce placebo-like effects on behavior, no research has examined how 
genetic beliefs might interact with behavior to influence the broader belief in free-will. 
The goal of this study was to do just that. We randomly assigned participants to learn 
that they possessed a gene-variant for a complex characteristic that we posited to be 
relatively neutral in desirability: risk-taking. Participants were induced to believe that 
they possessed a gene variant that was associated with either risk-taking or risk-
avoidance. Afterwards, they completed a behavioral measure of risk-taking and a 
measure of free-will beliefs. We had two specific hypotheses that we intended to 
address. 
Primary Hypothesis 1. Our first hypothesis was that people who were given 
genetic feedback indicating that they are genetically disposed to risky behavior would 
demonstrate higher risk-taking behavior than those who received feedback indicating 
that they are genetically disposed to risk aversion. This hypothesis follows logically 
from the findings of earlier research on the effects of genetic feedback on behavioral 
outcomes. However, to our knowledge, no study has examined the effect of genetic 
feedback on risk taking behavior. 
Primary Hypothesis 2. Our second hypothesis was that risk-taking behavior 
would interact with participants’ genetic feedback condition to predict beliefs in free-






be associated with a greater perception of free-will. That is, for people relatively high in 
risk taking, those in the risk aversion gene condition would report higher free-will 
beliefs than those in the risk-taking gene condition. For those low in risk taking 
behavior, those in the risk-taking gene condition would report higher free-will beliefs 
than those in the risk averse gene condition. This hypothesis was grounded in the idea 
that participants whose genetic feedback was incongruent with their actual risk-taking 
behavior would feel that they were able to somehow override the genetic influence, 









Introductory psychology students (N = 369; Mage= 18.82, SDage= 1.29) at Texas A&M 
University participated for partial course credit. These participants identified as male (N 
= 90), female (N = 277), or did not provide a gender identification (N = 2). Our sampling 
plan was to recruit as many participants as possible during an academic term, targeting 
about 200 participants per condition. Despite data being collected over the course of 
three academic semesters, we were not able to reach the target sample size. We recruited 
male and female participants who are 18 years of age or older. No other inclusion or 
exclusion criteria were utilized. 
2.2. Procedure 
Phase 1  
Participants signed up in the Sona system, a cloud-based participant management 
software, for a two-part study; they had to choose two different dates to come to the lab, 
that were set two weeks apart. Participants arrived at the lab in groups of 1 to 3. A 
trained experimenter greeted the participants and provided the introduction to the study. 
The study was described as being focused on genes and personality characteristics. The 
researcher explained that we were interested in how specific genes relate to self-reported 
personality, and that the study involved filling out some standard personality measures 
and providing a saliva sample that we would utilize for genetic testing for a certain 
genetic profile associated with aspects of personality.  Participants had an opportunity to 
ask questions during this initial introduction and were given an information sheet about 






If participants agreed to participate, they were ushered into private computer 
cubicles in a separate testing room and completed a number of survey measures not 
central to our primary hypotheses. After completing the Phase 1 survey, they were asked 
to provide a saliva sample. The experimenter handed participants a saliva sample kit, 
which included two synthetic cotton swabs in a sealed plastic tube and instructed them to 
swab the inside of their mouths and place the swab back into the tube and close it. The 
experimenter then confirmed the name of the participant and wrote a random number on 
the tube. When finished, participants were told that they should receive an email in a few 
weeks notifying them that the laboratory analysis was complete, and they could come to 
retrieve the results. The saliva sample was never sent for analysis but only used as a 
deceptive mechanism.   
Phase 2  
Two weeks later, participants returned to the laboratory to receive the bogus 
saliva test results and were informed that they possessed a gene variant that predisposed 
them to behave in a risky or risk-avoidant fashion. Participants were handed their 
random saliva test results, which were enclosed in a white envelope with their name on 
it. Participants read that they either possess a 7R+ variant of the DRD4 gene (indicating 
higher levels of risk-seeking), or a 7R- variant of the DRD4 gene (indicating lower 
levels of risk-seeking). On the computer screen, participants in both conditions read the 
following paragraph: 
“The Dopamine receptor D4 gene (DRD4) has been previously linked to risk-
taking propensity. Previous studies about behavioral traits and the DRD4 gene 






more risk-seeking than people without it (7R−), which makes them prone to take 
more risks in specific situations that may cause positive stimulation, (e.g., 
gambling, practicing extreme sports, migration, novelty seeking).  
Subsequently, participants were asked to type in their identification number, 
which led them to a different screen explaining that according to our records and the 
information they introduced in the system, they possessed either the 7R+ or 7R- variant 
of DRD4, as well as providing them an explanation of what that meant in terms of their 
proneness to risk taking, relative to the average individual. Following the receipt of the 
saliva test results, participants completed all the Phase 2 measures, which included a 
measure of free will. Lastly, participants received a formal debriefing that detailed the 
broad goals of the project and debunked the deception involved.  
2.3. Measures 
Phase 2 Measures 
Automatic Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Automatic BART). Participants 
completed the Automatic BART (Pleskac, et al., 2008), a computerized, laboratory-
based measure that involves actual risky behavior for which, similar to real-world 
situations, riskiness is rewarded up until a point at which further riskiness results in 
poorer outcomes. In the task, the participant was presented with a balloon and offered 
the chance to earn points by pumping the balloon up. All participants saw the same 
balloons in the same order to limit extraneous variability (Pleskac, Wallsten, Wang, & 
Lejuez, 2008). According to Pleskac et al. (2008), the task asks participants to “simply 
type the target number of pumps they wish to take at the beginning of a trial. Once they 






the stated number of pumps is reached or it explodes”. Thus, each pump confers greater 
risk, but also greater potential reward. Participants were informed that they could earn 
the most points on average if they pumped 64 times on each trial (Lejuez et al., 2002).1 
For means and standard deviations on the Automatic Balloon Analogue Risk Task see 
Table 1 in the Appendix. 
Free-will and Determinism Scale. The FAD–Plus (Paulhus & Carey, 2011) is a 
27-item measure of lay beliefs in free will and 3 closely related constructs: scientific 
determinism, fatalistic determinism, and unpredictability. Participants responded to 
items (e.g., “Chance events seem to be the major cause of human history”; “People have 
complete free will”) on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale. Paulhus & 
Carey (2011) provided support for the structure and construct validity of the scale and 
reported alpha reliabilities for each construct as follows: Free Will, .69; Scientific 
Determinism, .69; Fatalistic Determinism, .82. In this study, the overall reliability of the 
scale was strong (α = .732). For means and standard deviations on the Free-will and 
Determinism Scale see Table 1 in the Appendix. 
Demographics. Participants completed a series of standard demographics 
questions, including gender, race, age, and place of origin. They also completed a data 
integrity check item at the very end of the survey. 
  
 
1 Participants also completed other measures, but they were not my focus in this specific 







3.1.Effect of Condition on Risk Behavior  
The 174 participants in the positive risk genetic feedback condition (M = 
1992.03, SD = 435.71) compared to the 182 participants assigned to the negative risk 
genetic feedback condition (M = 1777.58, SD = 466.82) displayed significantly higher 
scores on the risk taking behavior measure, t(354) = -2.39, p = .017, 95%, CI [-208.68, -
20.22], d = 0.25. In other words, participants who were given genetic feedback 
indicating that they are genetically disposed to risky behavior demonstrated higher risk-
taking behavior than those who received feedback indicating that they are genetically 
disposed to risk aversion.  
3.2.Interactive Effect of Condition and Risk Behavior on Free Will Beliefs  
Regression analyses were conducted to test our second hypothesis. We entered 
the main effects of Genetic Feedback (dummy coded: 0 = Risk Taking, 1 = Risk Averse) 
and BART behavior (mean-centered) in Step 1, followed by the interaction in Step 2. 
There was no significant main effect of Genetic Feedback (β = 0.04, t(353) = 0.81, p = 
.422) or Bart behavior (β = -.08, t(353) = 1.40, p = .164). There was also no significant 
interaction (β = -.09, t(352) = 1.10, p = .274).  
We performed the same analysis for the free will subscales and found no 
significant results. Specifically, for the scientific determinism subscale, there was no 
significant main effect of Genetic Feedback (β = -0.04, t(354) = 0.73, p = .942) or Bart 
behavior (β = .02, t(353) = 2.9, p = .78). There was also no significant interaction (β = -






significant main effect of Genetic Feedback (β = .06, t(354) = 1.19, p = .235) or Bart 
behavior (β = -.10, t(353) = 1.9, p = .058), and no significant interaction (β = -.04, t(352) 
= .57, p = .569). Lastly, for the randomness subscale, there was also no significant main 
effect of Genetic Feedback (β = .03, t(354) = .57, p = .569) or Bart behavior (β = -.08, 








Building on findings of earlier investigations on the effects of genetic feedback 
on behavioral outcomes, our first primary hypothesis was that people who were given 
genetic feedback indicating that they are genetically disposed to risky behavior would 
demonstrate higher risk-taking behavior than those who received feedback indicating 
that they are genetically disposed to risk aversion. This hypothesis was confirmed. 
Participants who received genetic feedback indicating that they were genetically 
predisposed to risky behavior demonstrated higher risk-taking behavior than those who 
received feedback indicating that they were genetically predisposed to risk aversion.  
We also expected that an incongruence between behavior and genetic feedback 
would be associated with a greater perception of free-will. That is, for people relatively 
high in risk taking, those in the risk aversion gene condition would report higher free-
will beliefs than those in the risk-taking gene condition. Reversely, for those low in risk 
taking behavior, those in the risk-taking gene condition would report higher free-will 
beliefs than those in the risk averse gene condition. However, this second hypothesis, 
that risk-taking behavior would interact with participants’ genetic feedback condition to 
predict beliefs in free-will, did not generate support. The congruence between behavior 
and genetic feedback was not associated with a diminished perception of overall free-
will amongst participants, nor was it associated with diminished scores on the free will 
subscales (scientific determinism, fatalistic determinism, and randomness). 
4.1.The Effect of Genetic Feedback on Behavior 
Our finding that people who were given genetic information indicating that they 






than those who received information indicating that they were genetically disposed to 
risk aversion fits with earlier investigations on the effects of genetic feedback on 
behavioral outcomes (e.g.; Bloss, et al., 2011; Lineweaver, et al., 2014; Turnwald et al., 
2019). A potential reason why the effects of genetic etiology beliefs tend to extend to 
actual behavior is that they instill a set of expectations that guide people towards 
responses in line with those expectations, in a process similar to the placebo effect 
(Turnwald et al., 2019). While our study brings additional evidence in support of 
preexisting studies indicating that genetic beliefs can causally impact behavior, it also 
extends the extant literature in several different ways. First, to our knowledge, this is the 
first study to show that the effect of genetic beliefs on behavior is not limited to 
concrete, health-related outcomes, but can also impact more abstract and psychologically 
complex characteristics (i.e., risk-aversion). Although people’s intuition might be that 
health-related outcomes (e.g., obesity) are more heritable or genetically based than 
psychologically complex outcomes like risk aversion, our results indicate that genetic 
feedback for a more psychologically complex characteristic can also alter behavior. In 
other words, even when people likely have a weaker expectation of heritability or 
genetic influence in their lay intuitions, the effect of genetic information on behavior still 
exists. 
Secondly, our results also contribute to the existing literature by investigating the 
impact of genetic beliefs on behavior in relation to a less stigmatized variable. While 
previous studies have mainly investigated negatively-charged, health-related outcomes 
such as obesity (e.g., McVay, et al., 2016) or alcoholism (e.g., Dar-Nimrod, et al, 2013), 






both positively and negatively depending on context. Thus, we can conclude that despite 
the fact that an arguably more neutral behavior such as risk-taking might not have the 
same consequences to one’s self-perception, the effect of genetic information on 
behavior still exists.  
In sum, our study provides further evidence that genetic information carries 
weight when it comes to its impact on behavior. According to previous research, this is 
most likely because exposure to genetically based arguments evokes essentialist biases 
that lead people to adopt essentialist views, or, in other words, to see facts or events as  
natural, immutable, discrete, and solely caused by genetic influence (Vess et al., 2018). 
Our study also extends the literature by showing that the impact of genetic feedback is 
not restricted to those outcomes about which people likely have pre-existing strong 
heritability or genetic etiology beliefs, or domains where there is already a strong genetic 
link to the outcome; even when the outcome of interest is less obviously connected to 
genes, the effect of genetic information on behavior can still be observed.  
4.2.The Interactive Effect of Genetic Feedback and Behavior on Free-Will 
Beliefs 
Since our second hypothesis, that risk-taking behavior would interact with 
participants’ genetic feedback condition to predict beliefs in free-will, did not generate 
support, we can conclude that there is no interaction effect between general beliefs of 
free will and receiving genetic information. However, it is important to keep in mind that 
there are a couple alternative explanations for those findings. First, it is possible that 
general free-will beliefs are maintained, while specific free-will beliefs that are 






able to maintain a broad belief in free will, while still altering their free will beliefs about 
the specific behavior manipulated (risk taking). Since we only measured general free 
will beliefs, our data is mute regarding this possibility. Future studies should address this 
issue by including a free will measure specific to the task itself. 
Second, it is also possible that the subjective experience of free-will was not 
altered because people were unaware of the effect of the genetic feedback. Previous 
work on apparent mental causation (Wagner & Wheatley, 1999) suggests that people can 
experience agency even when they do not actually have it. The real causes of human 
behavior seem to be unconscious, so it is “not surprising that behavior could often arise 
without the person having conscious insight into its causation” (Wagner, 1999, p. 490). 
To address this possibility, future studies could consider measuring people's perceptions 
of their ability to control their behavior or introducing a measure of perceived free will 
over the upcoming task. 
4.3.Limitations and Future Directions 
Several limitations to this study should be noted. First, our study design only 
included one measure of risk taking, the Automatic Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
(Pleskac, et al., 2008). Sequential risk-taking tasks, especially the BART, have been 
widely used and proven powerful and useful methods in studying and identifying real-
world risk takers (Pleskac, et al., 2008). According to Pleskac’s et al. review (2008), the 
BART predicts real-world risk taking, such as smoking, illegal drug use, unprotected 
sex, and gambling, in a broad range of populations (e.g., Aklin, Lejuez, Zvolensky, 
Kahler, & Gwadz, 2005; Bornovalova, Gwadz, Kahler, Aklin, & Lejuez, 2008; Lejuez, 






2004, as cited in Pleskac et al, 2008). However, future studies might benefit from a more 
comprehensive measurement of risk-taking, using a combination of risk propensity 
scales (e.g., Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, & Allsopp, 1985; Zuckerman, 1994, as cited in 
Pleskac et al, 2008), as well as additional sequential risk-taking tasks, such as the TCU 
Self-Rating Form (Knight, Holcom and Simpson, 1994) or the Domain-Specific Risk-
Taking scale (Weber, Blais and Betz, 2002). Using additional measures would help 
establish more convergent support for this effect.  
Future studies should also consider investigating temporal durations of the effect 
of genetic information on behavior. Specifically, an important question to answer that 
our study did not address is whether the observed effects of genetic feedback on 
behavior persist over time, or whether they tend to dissipate after a while. A potential 
way of tackling this issue is by adjusting the study design so that behavior could be 
measured subsequently. Another beneficial addition to our current design could be 
including a measure of free will beliefs that is less global, and more specific to the task 
itself. It is possible that while general and abstract free will beliefs are not impacted, 
more concrete perceptions of one’s free will related to the task at hand could be. 
Additionally, future studies could consider measuring perceptions of how well 







5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, our study provides additional evidence for the importance of 
genetic information, as well as hopefully encourage future studies to continue to pay 
attention to the psychological effects of genetic feedback. The exploration of the broader 
implications of genetic testing, in particular its potential consequences for behavioral 
expression, psychological well-being, and self-perceptions, is essential considering the 
increasing popularity of direct-to-consumer genetic testing. The general availability and 
accessibility of genetic information might lead to genetic essentialism being an 
increasingly frequent fallacy in the modern, post-scientific revolution world, which 
could prove problematic considering the numerous negative implications of genetic 
essentialism (e.g. Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Heine, et al., 2017; Keller, 2005; Kimel, et 
al., 2016). Additionally, if genetic essentialism is indeed related to disbelief in free will, 
which needs further investigation, we might also have to add the beneficial outcomes of 
free will (e.g., Alquist, et al., 2013; Feldman, et al., 2016; Kondratowicz-Nowak & 
Zawadzka, 2018; Li, et al., 2018; MacKenzie, et al., 2014; ) to the list of the negative 
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Means and Standard Deviations on the Automatic Balloon Analogue Risk Task and 
            Free-will and Determinism Scale 
 
N M SD 
Risk-taking behavior  364 1828.55 458.03 
Free will 370 3.62 .53 
Scientific determinism 370 2.90 .52 
Fatalistic determinism 370 2.67 .87 
Randomness    370 3.40 .57 
 
 
 
 
 
